Lessons From The Number 7 Train Extension
With the sale of $2 billion in bonds in December, the financing for construction of the West Side extension to the No. 7 subway line is in place, and construction will begin later this year. The project will extend the No. 7 line from Times Square to a new subway station near the Javits Center at Eleventh Avenue and West 34th Street. An intermediate station, at Tenth Avenue and West 41st Street, has been discussed but is not currently funded.
The Number 7 extension was once merely one item on a laundry list of possible transit improvements. Now it has leapt past such long-discussed mega projects as the Second Avenue Subway in the journey from planners’ dream to reality. What happened to bring this about? What are the lessons for getting other big transportation projects done?
One key to the No. 7 extension’s fast progress involved the financing. Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Deputy Mayor Dan Doctoroff, champions of the project, recognized early on that the 7 extension would go nowhere if it had to compete for funding with the Second Avenue subway, connection of the Long Island Rail Road to Grand Central Terminal, airport rail access projects, a new tunnel from New Jersey, replacement of the Tappan Zee Bridge and other mega projects. Thus, they developed a novel funding method. The bonds issued last month, and another set of bonds to be issued in several years, will be paid off using payments made to City Hall in lieu of taxes by new residential, retail and office development on the West Side, payments for development rights in the eastern part of Hudson rail yards themselves, and from other taxes collected from the area. Having its own funding source was immensely important to bringing the 7 extension along.
Is this funding approach transferable to other projects? The city’s budget director, Mark Page, was skeptical when he addressed this question at a Bond Buyer’s conference in December. Page cited the unique circumstances of the far West Side development – the combination of the need for office space, proximity to Midtown and public investment in the area – as casting doubt that this financing plan could become a model to be replicated elsewhere in the city.
Part Of A Larger Goal
Other projects are indeed unlikely to replicate this funding structure. Yet there is a larger point that bears attention. The 7 extension was seen as critical to a bigger plan that involved development of the far West Side and Javits Center expansion. One lesson is thus that it is easier to get transportation projects to move forward when they are linked to broader goals.
A second lesson is that the benefits of accomplishing those goals – in this case, office, commercial and residential development of a declining industrial area – helping finance the transportation project itself. This is a critical point. Traditional sources of transportation funding are fuel-related taxes, motor vehicle fees, sales taxes, federal funds and voter-approved bonds. Using these sources, the beneficiary of the project pays, but so does everyone else.
What if the beneficiary were to pay? What if, for example, increased property taxes were used to finance a portion of the cost of the Second Avenue Subway? What if a similar arrangement were considered for downtown property that would benefit from direct rail access to JFK?
How would that work?
Funding Approaches
One approach is called tax increment financing (for more on TIFs, see this Independent Budget Office report). The problem with TIFs is defining the very generalized benefits from projects such as improved commuter rail access to the East Side. How do you identify and capture a portion of the flow of financial benefits?
Another approach to innovative financing involves various forms of public-private partnerships. One local example is the International Arrival Terminal at JFK Airport, where a private company invested $1.4 billion to construct a new passenger terminal in exchange for a 25-year concession. The private operator will collect user fees from the airlines using the terminal. Another rather spectacular example was a concession agreement for the Skyway Bridge in Chicago, which generated $1.83 billion for the City of Chicago. Officials in New Jersey are discussing such partnerships for the New Jersey Turnpike.
The State Transportation Department has pushed for “Transportation Development Partnerships,” which allow private investment in infrastructure projects although the public agency retains ownership. State Transportation Department staff have suggested that Transportation Development Partnerships could be used to build new highway lanes, replace the Tappan Zee Bridge or build new rail service. Such private-sector involvement is currently prohibited under state law, however.
Although the discussions do not explicitly make this point, under any private sector investment users of the facility will have to pay tolls or other charges in order for the private entity to recoup its investment.
Acting On Opportunities, Not Reacting To Problems
Another lesson from the 7 extension involves the merits of acting on opportunities. Local government tends to be reactive to problems. The far West Side development is an excellent example of government officials – in this case, fresh from the private sector – recognizing a huge opportunity for the city. This refreshing approach could be applied in other areas. Why, for example, ask whether traffic is bad enough to institute congestion pricing (discussed here last month)? Why not ask whether there isn’t a great opportunity to improve the quality of life in New York through less traffic, less noise, less pollution, greater safety, and greater funding for transportation improvements? Thinking in terms of opportunities frames the discussion around ways of making the city better and more attractive rather than bogging down in a debate over whether we can continue to tolerate long-standing problems.
The Need To Address Risk
A final lesson from the No. 7 extension is the need to address risk. City officials guaranteed payment on the bonds, using general fund revenues if necessary. One of the final decisions to be made was the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s agreement to pay for any cost overruns that exceed $100 million, an amount that City Hall agreed to pick up. The MTA has expressed confidence that it can manage the project within budget, although the Independent Budget Office’s deputy director, George Sweeting, testified before the City Council in October that “the likelihood of costs overruns are high”, considering that construction costs are increasing at 1 percent per month.
Whether the MTA should have accepted this risk is now a moot point. The need to bear – and ultimately to manage – financial risks, however, are an inherent part of any large construction project.
So in fact, the No. 7 extension does have some lessons for other projects, particularly those in desperate need of funding, such as airport rail access, a freight tunnel under the harbor, putting the Gowanus expressway replacement underground, or the Tappan Zee Bridge.
In his State of the State address, Governor Eliot Spitzer mentioned reform of the Wicks Law, which mandates cumbersome contracting procedures and is viewed as driving up costs. It remains to be seen whether the new governor puts more far-reaching changes such as private-public partnerships on his already bulging legislative agenda.
Bruce Schaller, who has been in charge of the transportation topic page since its inception in 1999, is head of Schaller Consulting, which provides research and analysis about transportation. He is also a Visiting Scholar at the Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management at New York University.Â
Congestion Pricing And The Future Of NYC: Addressing The Objections
In his much-anticipated speech on long-term planning for New York City, Mayor Michael Bloomberg laid out “10 aggressive but achievable goals” to meet the “three major challenges” of the future. One of the major challenges, he said, will be an expected explosion in population growth; one of the goals within that challenge will be to make sure traffic congestion “doesn’t bring our economy grinding to a halt.” And what would assure this? In his speech, the mayor talked about “adding to the capacity of our regional mass transit system, so that travel times stay the same – or get better.” But members of the panel discussion immediately afterwards specifically touched on whether congestion pricing – charging a fee to use congested streets or highways – should be used to provide traffic relief.
The mayor’s highlighting of the traffic issue came on the heels of two major reports, released a week earlier, on the traffic problem and congestion pricing as a potential solution.
The Partnership for New York City, a leading business group, released a report estimating that traffic congestion costs the region’s economy over $13 billion per year and over 37,000 lost jobs. The Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank, released a study, (which I was commissioned to conduct) which concluded that congestion pricing need not be the political non-starter that many people think it is, if it is carefully crafted to target the times and places where congestion is most severe.
Presentations on these two reports and an ensuing discussion at a Manhattan Institute forum are ably summarized in Streetsblog and the overall issues in Tom Angotti’s Land Use column on Gotham Gazette.
Meanwhile, Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer called on the city to apply for a federal grant to study congestion pricing, following in the footsteps of San Francisco. Councilmember Gayle Brewer announced that she plans to introduce a congestion pricing bill in the City Council to begin a public discussion of the issue.
Several newspapers weighed in with editorials, all saying much the same thing – it’s worth considering.
As the focus on congestion pricing intensified, pricing opponents stepped up their efforts to argue against a pricing plan. A newly formed group called the Committee to Keep New York City Congestion-Tax Free is being led by former Council member Walter McCaffrey. Queens Council member David Weprin has also been an outspoken opponent.
Opponents believe that they have the upper hand in this debate. Indeed, there is evidence for this view. Mayor Michael Bloomberg avoided mentioning congestion pricing in his speech. He was previously quoted in the New York Times as citing political obstacles in Albany as a reason to keep pricing off the agenda. The New York Post reported that Bloomberg would only support congestion pricing if all city residents – who account for most trips into the Manhattan Central Business district – were exempt.
Yet to achieve traffic relief, no other measure would be as effective as congestion pricing. What counterargument do opponents of pricing put forth? At the Manhattan Institute forum, McCaffrey declared, “A tax is a tax is a tax.”
Emphasizing an anti-tax message appears to be a smart strategy. In the focus groups I moderated for the Manhattan Institute study, it was clear that if people start by focusing on congestion fees as a tax, it is almost impossible to get them to consider possible benefits that might make it a worthwhile program. Opponents may be able to short circuit the debate by defining congestion fees as simply another tax.
An assessment of their arguments shows why they may want to end the discussion with the “tax is a tax is a tax” argument. Let’s take a look at the arguments that opponents are making.
- Charging motorists to use the East River bridges amounts to a tax.
- Auto commuters don’t have access to public transportation.
- Auto commuters are not wealthy individuals.
- Drivers would park in neighborhoods just outside a congestion pricing zone, thus clogging streets and multiplying the parking problems in these neighborhoods.
- Congestion fees would burden people who use their car for business.
- Congestion charging is a punitive measure.
- We should focus on trucks rather than autos.
- The economic effects of the plan will be devastating.
- Congestion charging in London has hurt businesses – 62 percent of businesses in London reported a drop in customers.
- Improvements to public transportation service to eastern Queens such as more express buses and park and ride lots are badly needed.
- The answer to traffic congestion is enforcement of double and triple parked cars and taxis stopping in the middle of the street.
At the Manhattan Institute forum, Weprin commented that he personally, as well as his constituents, detour to the Queensboro Bridge to avoid the Midtown Tunnel toll. The result of their choice is to clog other people’s neighborhoods with their cars in order to use a free bridge that is maintained with millions of taxpayer dollars.
The anti-congestion pricing folks are thus not so much defending their right to be tax-free as their desire to have other people pay for the bridges they use – with tax money, no less.
There is no doubt that neighborhoods in eastern Queens, southeastern Brooklyn and Staten Island that are beyond walking distance of a subway station need better transit service. Trips that some days take an hour can take two hours on other days. This problem should be a focus of any plan that includes congestion pricing.
But it is simply not true to imply that therefore, there is no access to public transportation from these outlying areas. In fact, census data show that only 28 percent of Manhattan-bound commuters who live in eastern Queens, southeastern Brooklyn or Staten Island drive to work. All the rest take the subway, express bus, Long Island Rail Road or ferry. Auto commuters do not lack access to transit; they simply choose the convenience and comfort of their cars over the inconvenience, uncertainty and hassles of transit.
Defining “wealth” in New York City is highly subjective. But census data show that Manhattan-bound auto commuters from the outlying parts of Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island earn 35 percent more than their more numerous counterparts who take the subway. Drivers may not be wealthy – but their less-wealthy neighbors would benefit from better public transportation that could be funded through congestion fees.
Anyone who has searched for a parking space in downtown Brooklyn, Long Island City or the Upper East or West Sides of Manhattan would probably like to know exactly where commuters put off by a congestion fee are going to park in these neighborhoods. The only all-day parking I’ve been able to find is in garages that make a congestion fee look quite affordable.
A congestion fee is thus unlikely to attract drivers to park just outside the Manhattan central business district. A fee would, however, reduce traffic flowing through these neighborhoods since over one-half of the cars traveling in Long Island City, and nearly one-half in downtown Brooklyn, are bound for Manhattan. Reducing traffic into Manhattan would thus provide traffic relief not just in Manhattan, but also Queens and Brooklyn.
Some, perhaps. But a lot of business people would gladly trade faster traffic and more predictable travel times for a few dollars a day in congestion fees.
This is in many ways the core of the anti-pricing argument. My focus group research found that fees are punitive – “taxes” – when there is no avoiding them. That’s why providing decent transit service to auto-heavy areas is so important. It’s also why it is important to point out that most drivers use their cars for reasons of comfort and convenience and do in fact have a transit alternative.
Truck traffic is a problem for both motorists and for residents of neighborhoods beset by high truck traffic. Conversely, traffic jams are a problem for truckers and for businesses and consumers who pay inflated prices for goods deliveries. But the traffic problem can not be solved by dealing with trucks, which make up only a small fraction of total traffic, especially during rush hour.
The Partnership study is the most comprehensive and rigorous evidence of the costs of not having a pricing program in New York. The most authoritative study conducted in London found that the economic effects of congestion pricing were “broadly neutral” – even without accounting for the value of travelers’ time savings. An article in the Journal of Economic Perspectives concludes that overall benefits from the London pricing program far outweigh the costs.
There was a drop in business during a recession that happened to coincide with the congestion charge. In fact, however, most businesses feel the charging scheme has been positive or neutral for their business and most firms in the charging zone support the pricing program.
Agreed. But do opponents have a way to pay for it? Maybe with someone else’s taxes?
Yes, better enforcement is needed. Opponents can show the sincerity of their commitment by lobbying Albany to approve camera enforcement of bus lanes. But enforcement requires expensive police efforts (paid for, presumably, by someone’s taxes) and will never be sustained at a level necessary to truly dent traffic congestion.
New York could well decide that it would rather live with traffic jams, even though they are only likely to worsen and lengthen as the city grows, than take the big leap forward of congestion pricing. New Yorkers might decide that they do not really mind the way that traffic affects our quality of life, our ability to get around by bus and taxi, and the lost jobs – at least not so much as to set up an elaborate pricing apparatus. But I think it is worth having that discussion as part of the mayor’s “conversation” about the city’s future.
Bruce Schaller, who has been in charge of the transportation topic page since its inception in 1999, is head of Schaller Consulting, which provides research and analysis about transportation. He is also a Visiting Scholar at the Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management at New York University.Â
Tough Times for Transit Workers
Though it happened a year ago, the 60-hour transit strike of 2005 is still very much alive for the members of Transport Workers Union Local 100.
--They await the findings of a state arbitration panel on the terms of their new contract, terms that, under state labor law, they must accept.
--Union members are electing a president and other local officials, with results to be tallied on December 15.
--The union members remains sharply split over the effects of last years strike on their individual well-being, on the union and on the labor movement as a whole.
The strike began on December 20, 2005 as 30,000 New York City transit workers walked off their jobs, shutting down the city’s subways and Metropolitan Transportation Authority buses. The move, in violation of state law, came after the Local 100 and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority failed to reach agreement on a range of issues, including health benefits and pensions. Two days and a half later, following marathon negotiating sessions with state mediators, labor and management reached a tentative agreement. To the delight of commuters, holiday shoppers and other New Yorkers, the subways were running again.
But the accord was short-lived. Union members rejected the pact agreed to by union president Roger Toussaint and other TWU leaders by a mere seven votes. In a revote, members approved the deal, but then MTA Chairman Peter Kalikow said it was too late: The offer was no longer on the take.
That sent the dispute to binding arbitration, in which a panel dictates terms of a new contract. That settlement could come any day – and around the same time union members learn who their president will be.
The following comments by Transport Workers Union President Roger Toussaint are adapted from a recent conference on the impact of the transit strike sponsored by City University, Cornell University Labor Programs and TWU Local 100 and from a debate between four of the five candidates for president, sponsored by the City University’s Joseph S. Murphy Institute for Worker Education and Labor Studies.
Assessing the Transit Strike
By Roger Toussaint
We knew that the first transit strike in a generation would be a big deal. But I am not sure we at Transport Workers Union Local 100 fully grasp, even today, just how big.
The message we have received since December is: You struck, you shut down New York. There has been public punishment, a public flogging, crippling finance, and an end to dues check off. A constant barrage in the media and the attacks by political leaders. The refusal of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority to honor the contract they agreed to and signed off on back in December.
The other side has said to trade unionists, “Don’t strike or else you will suffer heavy consequences. Awfully bad things will happen to you.”
So how should we assess the strike? An overall assessment will have to wait a bit but there are a couple of questions that I think are appropriate to address now.
One is why we struck and two is why we went back when we did.
WHY WE STRUCK
Let me state for the record that we did not go on strike to undo globalization, to topple the U.S. economy or to overthrow the Bloomberg regime. I know we have a reputation as a militant union and that I have a reputation for direct action. But that is not why we went on strike.
Creating a â€Credible Threat’
The short version why of why we went on strike is because the transit authority did not believe that we would go on strike. In order to get anything at the bargaining table, in order to stop the full-scale looting, we needed the credible threat of a strike. Credible threat. Did we have one? Not from the viewpoint of the MTA. The MTA did not think we would strike. The mayor did not think we would strike. Neither did the governor.
My guess is that even our members thought that eight or nine months of bargaining and threats of strike would not result in a strike. Most transit workers thought it would come down to the wire and we would back off.
That was not an unreasonable assumption on their part because that is what has happened for a quarter of a century, not just with us but with almost every other union. The MTA probably concluded that we were just talking tough and that we were not ready to strike.
Preparing for Action
In 2005, Local 100 told the MTA that if they screwed with pensions there would be a strike. We prepared for a strike very publicly, and they still did not believe us. The actions started a year before the strike deadline arrived: union building and training hundreds of new shop stewards, action with the rank and file, basic training for a new generation of strike captains. We marched with picket signs saying, “just practicing.”
In early December, we had simultaneous actions at 85 properties with thousands of members participating. For those of you who are practitioners and students of the labor movement and labor historians, we had a greater percentage of members involved in strike preparation than those who participated in the famous Flint sit down strike against General Motors in 1937.
It was the biggest strike preparation in Local 100 history. We stressed in private sessions that if the MTA continued with its assault on our pensions, we were walking, Taylor Law or no Taylor Law. I don’t know what else we could have done to tell them we were serious. Maybe we could have rented the Goodyear blimp, but it seemed the MTA still would not believe us.
The â€Bare-Bones Contract’
So what happened? When MTA Chairman Peter Kalikow entered the room at the 11th hour the MTA’s intention was to force the transit union to accept a bare-bones contract. We told them that this could not be a bare-bones contract, that we needed a pension refund, medical coverage for retirees, paid maternity leave, that needed paid schooling and all of these items that were critical for transit workers.
The MTA voted to reduce pensions for new hires right from the start. We said, “Hell no” right from the start. That was off the table by early December. Then the MTA came in at the very last minute, after we had bent over backward to try to reach a deal, after we had extended the contract for 12 days, they came back after the weekend with a new demand to create a lower pension tier for all new hires -- for our nephews and nieces and all our children and our neighbors’ children.
Forget the fact that this new pension demand was illegal and improper under the law. They were willing to risk a strike and what the MTA claimed was up to $1 billion of economic activity for a pension provision that had a value of $20 million. They thought we were too weak and too divided to resist.
The results of a generation without strikes had emboldened the MTA. From their perspective, we did not present a credible threat. I think, however, that they will believe us next time. I also think that they will take labor leaders more seriously now.
Disgust with the MTA
Local 100 did not want a strike. The strike was forced on us. But Local 100 members badly wanted a fight. Local 100 members wanted a chance to take a shot at the MTA after all the years of abuse and disrespect. Our members rejoiced at the chance to stand up straight and tell management where to go. They told us that it was time to take the MTA down a peg, whatever it cost.
When we came into office, there were thousands of disciplinary actions against transit workers a year. There continue to be thousands of disciplinary actions a year, and there is a lot of work to be done in this area, but we have eliminated for 70 percent of all members the notion of being under house arrest when they are out sick. Our members are no longer required to stay at home when they are sick.
At the end of the day, though, the way to handle a transit authority that is out of control on discipline is to have a strong union on the job. A strong union, strong policing, enforcement of the contract, that’s the way you push back against management. You need contract language and protection, but without enforcement and policing on the job, the contract language means nothing.
We polled our members quietly in the weeks before the strike deadline, and the polls showed that 65 percent of the members were in favor of a one-week strike. We conducted another poll while we were negotiating, and that percentage had climbed to 73 percent of the members in favor of a strike. Those are huge numbers in this business.
Against the Odds
The strike posed real risks and threats to Local 100. I have conducted six strikes in Local 100 – two with Liberty Bus Lines, two out in Queens, and two out in Connecticut. In my previous lives I have been involved in many strikes, bitter strikes. They are very, very serious business. It is easier to go out strong than it is to come back strong.
A losing strike threatens the very survival of the union itself. A losing public sector strike in 2006 damages the labor movement. Reflect for a moment on the defeat of the air traffic controllers in 1981 and the impact that that has had on the labor movement for a quarter of a century.
My responsibility as the president of the union was to get a victory and to bring back our members as quickly as possible. We were up against the MTA, a governor who wants to be president, a billionaire mayor, media, a united New York City business establishment, an international union president who told our members to return to work, longstanding public dissension inside Local 100, and mounting fines against the union, its members and all its leadership. We are up against a culture back decades of arrogance by one of the most out of control agencies in the state.
But we went out on strike strong and united. We put 11,000 members on the picket lines and over 20,000 in support of the lines. We had some scabs – not many, but too many.
This was not a union where people could be expected to hold their tongue until the strike was over even though that is the time tested union way of doing things. We are talking, after all about Transport Workers Union Local 100. We have a long history of dissension inside our union. We wash our laundry out in public even before it is dirty.
WHY WE RETURNED TO WORK
Why did we end the strike? Because we were able to stop the MTA assault on our pensions. Because we were able to get advances in several areas with real value to transit workers. We ended the strike because we were able to secure pension reform good for all our members and for all future transit workers. We ended the strike because we were able to obtain a new medical benefit for transit workers between the time they retire and when they become eligible for Medicare at age 65. We ended the strike because the MTA had enough and was feeling more pressure than it thought it would.
And we ended the strike because there did not seem to be a full army of reinforcements on the horizon inside the labor movement. We had a conference call with labor leaders during the strike. I told them I was not looking for someone to hold my coat. I was looking for leaders who would take off their coats and step into the ring. I did not see a lot of coats come off.
And there were serious risks: the risk of the international union imposing trusteeship on Local 100, and the risk of direct seizure of the union by the courts or the NYPD. It was time to claim our victory and end the strike.
LEARNING FROM THE STRIKE
Looking over the months from December to date, probably the most important lesson that we learned is how to communicate the provisions in the contract for the members. Clearly there were some weaknesses in that area. In the first vote, we relied more on written communication than in one-on-one discussions with our members in the crew rooms, the lunchroom or the shop. The second time we voted on the contract, we relied more on one-on-one conversations with members. This is, of course, an enormous undertaking because you’re talking 35,000 members spread over a very expansive property.
Strikes are very serious. And if one is on the transportation industry of New York City, a global village, it is even more so. The pain is real. The wounds are real.
The dark clouds that surround the entire labor movement, the adverse climate nationally and the concessions being made by unions around the country, make it much more difficult for us to defend what we have. This will be the defining battle for the labor union for the next several years. The outcome is not dictated by the Local 100. All we can do is stand with the rest of the labor movement and urge that a common line be drawn to defend health benefits and pensions so that decent jobs in America continue include guaranteed health benefits and guaranteed pensions.
It is often said that freedom is a hard won challenge and every generation has to win it again. After a generation without strikes we had to win back the sense that we have the right to stand up for ourselves. We had to win back the sense of sacrifice that every real struggle demands. We had to win back the tool of a public strike in a city that has lost its tradition of solidarity.
We did all of this and more. For myself and for all the thousands of strikers who stood up when we had to, it was our proudest hour. We did not strike to make history. We struck and so we made history.
Roger Toussaint is president of TWU Local 100.
The Other Candidates: The Union Is Failing Its Members
In the election, Toussaint faces four challengers: union vice president Ainsley Stewart, who opposed the proposed contract; Michael Carrube, a former Toussaint ally; Anthony Staley, a subway cleaner and relative newcomer to union politics; and Barry Roberts, a union vice president. The following statement by three of the candidates are excerpted from comment they made at a debate sponsored by the City University’s Joseph S. Murphy Institute for Worker Education and Labor Studies. Barry Roberts was invited to that debate but declined to participate.
Workers Need A Strong Offense
Our founding father, Mike Quill, said: “We were no experts in the field of labor organization, but we had something in common with our fellow workers – we were all poor. We were all overworked. We were all victims of an 84-hour week. In fact, we were so low down on the economic and social ladder we had no way to go but up.”
That fact still holds true today.
The current leadership has lacked in the area that really affects our membership -- how members work hours upon hours just to make ends meet. How our wage increases have been below the cost of living. Our members donate their time to this job away from their families and their loved ones. That has got to change.
Discipline rules have been modified, but not enough. Discipline is an epidemic with the transit authority.
There have been no negotiations regarding the night differential [extra pay for working at night]. The last time our night differential was negotiated was in 1988. In 1996, then president Willie James gave away our night differential on overtime. To this day, that has not been renegotiated.
We are looked upon in the public arena as weak. And that has got to change.
Our current bylaws have never been handed out to our membership. Our membership is not educated in the sense that they know how to stay out of trouble and how the contract protects them. We need more union representation in the field and better-educated shop stewards in order to fight management.
I think [the negotiating on the last contract] was poorly done. Right after a contract is ratified, you have to set your union up for three years down the road, investigating all the MTA’s holdings with a team of members, officers and lawyers. Then we would be prepared for anything.
The union has always been on the defensive. It’s time that we go on the offense.
-- Michael Carrube
Losing Ground
The union never took a really strong position to defend the members. If you are paying dues you should be treated better and defended better than we were being treated.
With discipline, management is running amok. This discipline has gotten worse because nothing has been done to stop the MTA from doing what they want. They continually write people up. One of the things that I would do is train representatives to represent people at their hearings. Under the present president, discipline has gotten worse, because nothing has been done to stop the MTA from doing what they want.
If you walk through the system, that’s the best way to get your gauge on what’s going on. Ask some of the people actually doing the work. The present president lost touch with the membership, he doesn’t know what’s going on within the system, he doesn’t even walk through it.
We don’t have anyone intelligent enough to challenge the MTA and make them go by the contract and stick to the rules. Nobody is strong enough to do that, and that is why the members are suffering now.
People who get up out of their beds to come to work should be compensated justly, as well as have decent health benefits. But in the last two contracts, this union regressed. It is not the formidable union it once was.
-- Anthony Staley
Too Much Secrecy, Too Little Money
A fair day’s work requires a fair day’s pay. It is a human right to be able to work and get livable wages. If the transit authority has money, transit workers must get their fair share. You’ll never see money like this again in the transit authority; if you can’t score now – you’ll never score.
Toussaint agreed with the transit authority to write us up whenever we use up our sick time, even if we have a doctor’s letter. At the same time Toussaint accused the transit authority of plantation justice, he was aiding the enemy in a new and more aggressive path toward terminating all members when they use those 12 sick days. But we have no control over the viruses that attack us and the hazards that we are exposed to over the years
The representation we have is more concerned with giving back to the transit authority than demanding more for the workers, so we can keep up with the cost of living.
Short of eliminating the disciplinary system what we need to do is ensure that members receive representation from the reps they elect -- and that those reps are educated in how to handle disciplinary cases. We will take them to training where they will spend three to six months learning every word in the contract, they will have access to all the resources within the union, which cases we won, why won them how we lost them and how could move toward winning them in future. We will ensure the member’s voice is heard
The problem now is a lack of transparency. The union has headquarters that it sold. We have never seen an ad in the newspaper saying the building was up for sale, we have never seen an appraisal report, we have not seen a check from the proceeds of the sale.
In the last negotiation, more members participated at the street level. But when it came to negotiating health benefits everyone was excluded. The president alone did that. In my administration, that will not happen. The ability to express different ideas and opinions is the backbone of every union. You must have people express those ideas and opinions and then pick up from there and move forward.
Everything is being done in the dark. We have never had one meeting to discuss what is going on in the arbitration process.
Under my administration, that will never happen. As a matter of fact we would never get to arbitration. We will have a contract on that deadline.
Transit workers recognize that we do not come here as a hobby, we come here to make money to take care of our families and to advance the labor movement. At the end of the day, we need to get fair wages and fair compensation for the work that we perform because we move New York.
-- Ainsley Stewart
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